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Hedge funds are often viewed from a positive or negative lens in the public and academic forum. However,
both of these perspectives neglect structuralist factors. This paper analyzes the effect of these antecedent
economic, political, and legal structures. I argue that these structures are at the root of hedge fund behavior,
particularly during financial crises. The financial crises of two peripheral countries, Iceland and Cyprus, are
used as case studies to illustrate how hedge fund involvement diverges as a result of structural factors.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, there was a universal 
instinctual search for blame. Hedge funds, perceived as opaque speculation 
vehicles, naturally became the antagonists of the press, politicians, and public. This 
was particularly severe for the Eurozone crisis, where the market assault on the 
Euro, sovereign debt, public banking sector securities, and contagion fears were 
heavily pronounced. David Oddsson, former Icelandic Prime Minister and 
governor of the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI), scathingly remarked that “there is 
an unpleasant odour of unscrupulous dealers [hedge funds] who have decided to 
make a last stab at breaking down the Icelandic financial system. They will not get 
away with it.” (Ibison 2008).  
Oddsson’s dramatic finger-pointing should not come as a surprise given the 
island country’s unprecedented circumstances. In the span of three consecutive 
days in October 2008, the country’s three largest private banks became insolvent 
after the post-Lehman collapse liquidity crunch, earning the title of the largest 
systemic banking collapse in history relative to the size of the national economy 
(The Economist 2008). Meanwhile, Cyprus, another peripheral island-state with an 
outsized private banking sector, initially weathered the 2008 global financial crisis, 
only to befall the same fate as Iceland five years later in 2013. The two largest 
Cypriot banks, Laiki and Bank of Cyprus (BoC), experienced severe asset write-
downs due to Greek holdings in 2013 following Greece’s private-sector-
involvement (PSI) restructuring1, putting them into instantaneous bankruptcy.  
These two situations were global open-invitations for hedge funds to deploy 
capital in equity, debt, and currency markets on long/short bases, through 
derivatives, and with substantial leverage. They doubled-down on massive carry-
trades made in 2006 to profit on Iceland’s pre-crisis interest-rate differential (Aliber 
& Zoega 2011), later unwinding their positions in 2008 and shorting the Icelandic 
króna as the country’s scales tipped (ibid). Funds shorted Icelandic bank debt via 
credit-default swaps (CDS) on the way down but reversed their positions by buying 
into debt at the bottom during CDS auctions (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017). They 
snapped up Cypriot sovereign debt on the belief that taxpayers would bear the brunt 
of the refinancing as they had in Spain and Greece (Thomas 2012). Some bought 
BoC deposits for 20 cents on the dollar and eventually recouped 63 cents of value 
excluding fresh equity (Forelle 2013), while others purchased uninsured Laiki 
deposits that remained frozen for years and thus were worthless (Winkworth et al. 
2013). The medley of ventures hedge funds undertook in Iceland and Cyprus raises 
the question: are they inherently negative or positive actors in financial crises? 
                                               
1 The Greek PSI was a private restructuring of the country’s debt obligations that resulted in a 
53.5% write-down of debt or a 70% loss in value for creditors (Eurogroup 2012) 
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1.1 A STRUCTURALIST MODEL FOR HEDGE FUND ACTORS 
 
There are two main negative critiques of hedge fund influence: they 
contribute to the build-up of asset bubbles and their excessive leverage coupled 
with speculative behavior results in market contagion and increased volatility. As 
this paper focuses on crisis-behavior, I will focus on the contagion volatility critique 
and argue that contagion and introduction of market volatility is a byproduct of pre-
existing structural deficiencies rather than the exogenous agency of hedge funds. 
Defenders of hedge funds typically point to their ability to act as an agents of 
pricing fidelity or injectors of liquidity. These are valid functions that play out in 
crises, but in the same vein as the contagion critique, this paper will show that these 
beneficial contributions are only made possible to the extent permitted by a fund’s 
environment. Ability to inject liquidity in particular is symptomatic of broader 
systemic dynamics that hedge funds cannot unilaterally create. Furthermore, both 
of the positive and negative viewpoints critically neglect a comprehensive 
consideration of antecedent structural elements from the perspective that these 
structures are the root of hedge fund behavior2.  
I will thus challenge the notion that hedge funds are fundamentally positive 
or negative financial actors during crises. Rather, hedge funds follow a structuralist 
model—the nature of their activities and consequently their influence in society is 
analogous to fluid conforming to the endogenous institutional contours of its 
environment. By structures, I am referring to economic, political, and legal 
configurations that pre-date hedge fund market behavior. As foils to pre-existing 
fundamental opportunities or deficiencies, hedge funds are neutral, reflexive, and 
reactionary. They may augment the volatility during the onslaught of a financial 
crisis but lack the agency to unilaterally create the infrastructure for a crisis. They 
may fulfill beneficial market functions during turmoil but can do so only to the 
extent permitted by pre-existing architectures.  
I will use the complementary cases of Iceland and Cyprus to illustrate this 
point and will reference two partners (‘Partner A’ and ‘Partner B’) at an interviewed 
hedge fund source that transacted in both crises. In Iceland, hedge fund activity 
emerged in three main forms. Initially, the country’s sustainably high interest rates 
galvanized substantial carry-trades, that when unwound, wreaked havoc on the 
Icelandic króna (Aliber & Zoega 2011). Hedge funds thereafter began shorting the 
króna in the foreign exchange (FX) markets as well as bank debt through credit 
default swaps (CDS) (Bergmann 2014). The Iceland hedge fund saga culminated 
in the brazen ‘loan-to-own’3 debt trade, whereby foreign creditors seized control of 
                                               
2 See Palaskas et al. (2013), Stromqvist (2009), and Wiethuechter (2010),  
3 Loan-to-own refers to the strategy of purchasing a distressed or bankrupt company’s debt at a 
significant discount to face value and receiving equity post-reorganization, resulting in control of 
the company and its assets. 
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the entire legacy banking sector for cents on the dollar and entered into years-long 
negotiations with the government to lift capital controls and thus monetize the trade 
(Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017). There was a limited role for hedge funds in 
sovereign debt given Iceland’s healthy national debt levels of 28% of GDP in 2007 
(Fitch Ratings 2008).  
Hedge fund activity in Cyprus was less extraordinary than activity in 
Iceland despite surface-level parallels in the opportunity-set. Nonetheless, the 
Cypriot financial crisis bolsters a structuralism argument, as the lack of hedge fund 
involvement at the Icelandic scale is rooted in subtle structural differences. Cyprus’ 
significant sovereign debt, international English legal system governing foreign 
creditors, bank reliance on Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) capital as 
opposed to private capital, weak insolvency and foreclosure system, and position 
of the troika as a lender-of-last-resort (LLR) are all crucial structural factors that 
sculpted the character of hedge fund activities. The three most meaningful hedge 
fund activities in Cyprus were buying distressed deposit claims, injecting fresh 
capital in BoC’s recapitalization, and investing in sovereign debt, of which the first 
two provided constructive liquidity in a secondary market to the banking system.  
This paper is structured into five parts. Part 1 has been this introduction. 
Part 2 contains background information on hedge funds and both crises. Part 3 and 
4 are analyses of the various hedge fund activities undertaken during the Icelandic 
and Cypriot crises, respectively, demonstrating how they fit into a structuralist 
perspective. In Part 5 I will present my concluding thoughts.  
 
2 BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF HEDGE FUNDS 
 
The defining characteristic of hedge funds is that they countervail the U.S. 
Investment Company Act of 1940 through various legal forms (Brown & 
Goetzmann 2003); the act prohibits ‘investment companies’ (e.g. mutual funds) to 
leverage and short-sell securities (U.S. Congress 1940)4. Accordingly, the definition 
of a hedge fund has become both colloquial and fluid with no concrete boundaries, 
functioning in practice as a subjective ‘smell-test’. Non-investment companies that 
engage in (1) trading relatively liquid, as opposed to illiquid securities5, (2) 
                                               
4 To prevent having their capacities restricted, hedge funds took on three characteristics: (a) lack of 
access to the general public (Hardie & McKenzie 2006), (b) ‘non-solicitation’ to potential 
investors, communicating only by ‘word-of-mouth’ (Fung and Hsieh 1999, p. 315), and (c) 
limiting quantity of investors in their funds. 
5 Distressed debt funds often invest in highly illiquid debt securities and serve as an example of 
how hedge funds fail to conform to a strict definition or scope of activities. 
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investing without any regulatory restrictions particularly on asset classes they can 
pursue, and (3) applying leverage and short-selling, are perceived as hedge funds. 
Three forms of hedge funds played roles in Iceland and Cyprus: event-
driven, global macroeconomic, and distressed debt strategies. Event-driven funds 
focus on hard catalysts to realize value in a trade that can span a firm’s capital 
structure; common wagers include speculating on closure of a corporate takeover, 
a spinoff that will unlock or destroy value, or declaration of bankruptcy. Global 
macroeconomic hedge funds buy and sell currencies and sovereign debt, often 
trading spreads between relative interest-rates. Distressed debt funds, caricatured 
as ‘vulture funds,’ buy and sell debt trading at a significant discount to face value 
due to bankruptcy risk. These three strategies frequently overlap. 
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE ICELANDIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
2.2.1 PRECURSORS TO ICELAND’S FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
Iceland, a former Danish colony-island that gained independence in 1944, 
is the smallest-populated country in the world that controls its own currency 
(population of 330,000). At the turn of the century, Iceland experienced a period of 
rapid growth driven by desire to join the European Economic Area (EEA). The 
three major Icelandic banks (Kaupthing, Landsbanki, and Glitnir) were privatized 
in the 1990s, the króna was floated, and the new government coalition aggressively 
pursued procyclical fiscal policies (Aliber & Zoega 2011). These three factors 
would later result in a ‘twin crisis’ (Kaminsky and Reinhardt 1999) of rapid 
currency depreciation and a failed banking system without a lender-of-last-resort. 
This colossal banking system failure was one of the most exceptional financial 
special situations in decades, causing distressed debt hedge funds to flock to Iceland 
in a magnitude never before seen. 
 
2.2.2 ICELANDIC BANKS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE ‘VIKING CAPITALIST’ 
 
The foundation for the crisis began in 2002, after completion of Iceland’s 
bank privatization process. Formerly benign and domestically isolated banks began 
transforming into unrecognizable behemoths post-privatization, giving rise to a 
‘Viking Capitalist’ class of risk-takers (Bergmann 2014). They took advantage of 
globally low interest rates to consolidate both domestically and internationally, 
resulting in incestuous relationship, bulging balance sheets, and global risk 
exposure. The undertaking of foreign debt to finance M&A allowed them to grow 
from less than a single year’s GDP in the 1990s to accumulating EUR 115bn of 
assets on the eve of the crisis (Benediktsdóttir et al. 2017; Bergmann 2014). Many 
of the assets they acquired with this newfound capital were foreign gems, which 
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would later become a crux of their restructuring and influence hedge fund behavior6. 
Despite riding on billions in foreign debt, the three banks achieved AAA credit 
ratings, allowing further access to cheap international debt offerings (ibid). These 
credit ratings were imprudently supported by the near debt-free Icelandic state, who 
was assumed to be capable of injecting fresh capital should the banks ever stumble. 
The triumph of the Viking Capitalists was reflected in the ICEX stock index’s nine-
times increase from 2001 to 2007 with 70% of its pre-crisis value in financial 
services (ibid). Thriving equities increased household wealth by 300%, generating 
a domestic consumption boom facilitated through easy consumer credit (ibid). 
 
2.2.3 THE ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT’S PROCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICIES  
 
Simultaneously, the Icelandic government undertook a series of procyclical 
Keynesian policies to fulfill lofty election promises. Monetarily, this began with 
the floating of the króna, but soon encompassed a far greater fiscal regime revolving 
around home ownership and public infrastructure. Property tax was abolished, and 
the corporate tax rate halved. The Housing Fund provided low rate mortgage 
support at an unprecedented 90% of market value, often in competition with the big 
three banks’ own mortgage lending, causing home prices to surge and increasing 
downwards pressure on rates. Several funding programs were passed to build the 
infrastructure of aluminum production, contributing another 5% to GDP growth 
(Bergmann 2014). In stark opposition, the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) was 
consistently raising rates, from 5.3% in 2001 to 15.5% before the crash due to 
concerns of inflation (CBI Database). This interest rate tension prompted a 
gargantuan international carry-trade manifested in foreign appetite for Icelandic 
bank debt; Section 3.1 will elaborate further. 
 
2.2.4 ICELAND’S 2008 ‘TWIN-CRISIS’  
 
This backdrop of a newly floated currency, emboldened Viking Capitalists 
pushing the limits of corporate ‘outvasion’, and aggressive procyclical government 
policies captures why Iceland’s crash occurred as violently as it did, manifested as 
a ‘twin crisis’ of both currency and bank failures. Lehman’s troubles in 2008 
initiated a liquidity crunch for all three of Iceland’s banks and they all collapsed in 
a matter of three consecutive days in 2008 after failing to refinance short-term 
maturities (Bergmann 2014). The ensuing capital flight pummeled the króna more 
than 35% against the Euro over nine months and it later bottomed at 80% of its 
peak value since it was floated (CBI 2008; Burton et al. 2013). As the crisis spread 
                                               
6 Examples: Glitnir acquired partial ownership of the HoldCo of American Airlines during this 
period. Kaupthing bought Denmark’s third largest bank (FIH), and Landsbanki acquired eastern 
European phone companies and pharmaceutical firms (Bergmann 2014). 
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to Europe and uncertainty penetrated every financial market, the value of the three 
banks’ sprawling network of international assets was increasingly called into 
question leading to severely discounted bank debt. Landsbanki, more than the other 
two banks, was under monumental pressure. It had financed its assets with a higher 
ratio of foreign deposits (as opposed to foreign debt) under the Icesave product, 
giving rise to a tense political standoff with the UK and the Netherlands on which 
country was responsible for insuring these foreign deposits. The UK quickly froze 
Landsbanki’s assets under the Anti-Terrorism Act (Bergmann 2014), which caused 
additional discounts on the value of Landsbanki debt.  
In light of these complications, it was economically crucial to allow 
uninterrupted banking access. Three new banks were incorporated to absorb the 
domestic operations of Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki, the last of which 
became state-owned. The government, along with a USD $2.1bn IMF loan, 
provided the debt to recapitalize the new banks (Bergmann 2014). The equity of 
the new banks was majority owned by the estates of the old banks. These estates, 
whose expansive global assets were highly illiquid and impaired, went into the 
hands of a winding-up board where creditors could make claims on residual value 
(Moore 2018). The primary creditors at the failed banks were previously European 
banks who had lent outside the Eurozone to capture higher rates. During the crisis, 
they hastily exited their positions at bargain prices. This exit effectively 
transformed the bank debtholders into a new type of sophisticated activist investor 
that would seek to maximize these estate values to the fullest extent: distressed debt 
hedge funds (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017).  
 
2.3 OVERVIEW OF THE CYPRIOT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
The Cypriot crisis in many ways emulates what occurred during 2008 in 
Iceland, only five years later and within the framework of the European Union, 
which Cyprus joined in 2004. Like Iceland, Cyprus had permitted its private 
banking sector, composed of Laiki and the larger Bank of Cyprus (BoC), to grow 
to an unsupportable eight-times GDP by 2013 (Theodore & Theodore 2015). This 
was encouraged by inordinately high-interest rates (a $1mm deposit would earn 
over $300,000 in interest in five years), increased market access from EU 
membership, and Russian demand for tax-friendly Cypriot-domiciled business 
treatment (ibid). Out of the 31bn EUR in bank deposits at Laiki, 12bn were from 
Russia, with Russian oligarch Rybolovlev even owning 10% of Bank of Cyprus 
(Theodore & Theodore 2015, p.40; Wilson 2012). These close-ties incited 
speculation of Cyprus as a money-laundering haven and would later affect the 
troika’s punitive bail-in response.  
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2.3.1 THE GREEK PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT (PSI) AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
CYPRIOT BANKING SECTOR 
 
Critically, however, Cyprus’ balancing act did not immediately collapse in 
2008 after the bursting of the global asset bubble. The country’s inclusion in the 
Euro currency zone protected against immediate and rapid currency depreciation. 
Cyprus experienced a minor recession caused by a moderate drop in tourism, 
spurring the government to respond with spending initiatives at the detriment of its 
fiscal balance. Yet, nothing was done to rein in unconscionable bank debt. Most 
problematically, Laiki and BoC still held billions of euros in distressed Greek debt 
and Greek assets on their balance sheets, and at a higher relative concentration than 
other EU member-states (Theodore & Theodore 2015). In 2011, the country’s 
fortunes rapidly capitulated due to the accidental explosion of the Evangelos 
Florakis Naval Base, which caused $3bn USD in damages, turned a mild fiscal 
surplus into a 6% deficit, and prompted credit downgrades that constricted access 
to the capital markets (ibid). Consequently, Cyprus received a 2.5bn EUR loan from 
Russia in 2012 to buttress its fiscal standing without turning to the IMF, but none 
of these funds were used to recapitalize the banks (ibid). The final blow came in 
the form of the Greek Private-Sector Involvement plan (PSI), which was manifested 
in a 53.5% write-down of Greek debt, or 70% value loss (Eurogroup 2012). The 
result was a 3.5bn EUR erasure of value (approx. 10% of GDP) on Laiki and BoC’s 
balance sheets (Ewing 2012), putting both banks into spontaneous bankruptcy with 
the nation unable to provide the funds for a bailout.  
 
2.3.2 THE BAIL-IN SOLUTION FOR CYPRUS  
 
The controversial solution adopted for Cyprus was a troika-forced ‘bail-in’: 
10bn EUR of relief funds (9bn EUR from the ESM and 1bn EUR from the IMF) 
for the banking sector were contingent on applying a haircut to deposits and 
subsequently converting both domestic and foreign deposits into equity in a 
reorganized bank (Christou & Kyris 2017; Duve & Wimalasena 2015). This 
entailed several steps: Laiki’s ‘good assets’ in Cyprus were purchased by BoC for 
an 18% equity share in the latter (this included deposits under 100,000 EUR), while 
the ‘bad assets’, including uninsured7 deposits over 100,000 EUR, were left to 
whittle away in the old and defunct Laiki. Operations in Greece owned by both 
Laiki and BoC were sold to Greek bank Piraeus; the few junior bondholders in both 
banks were written down to zero; lastly, a levy of 9.9% was applied to all uninsured 
rolled up BoC deposits over 100,000 EUR and a 6.75% levy was applied to deposits 
under 100,000 EUR (Theodore & Theodore 2015). This levy was applied by 
                                               
7 Uninsured refers to deposits over 100,000 EUR 
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reducing the amount of equity deposit holders received in the deposit-to-equity 
conversion. Sovereign bondholders in upcoming maturities were paid off in full 
using a combination of these depositor contributions and troika assistance (ibid). 
The economic cost of this maneuver was substantial. GDP in the latter half of 2013 
declined 5.9% and unemployment increased to 16.9% as the country lost faith in its 
banking system and consumer confidence bottomed (Christou & Kyris 2017). 
Hedge funds were involved in all three types of securities in the bail-in maneuver. 
First, they bought out frozen deposits themselves primarily in BoC before the 
announcement of the bail-in. Second, they contributed cash for fresh equity in the 
recapitalized banks. Finally, they bought sovereign debt on the belief that a Greek-
style write-down would not occur, and creditors would be made whole 
notwithstanding the dire economic situation.  
 
3 ANALYSIS OF HEDGE FUNDS IN ICELAND 
 
3.1 THE CURRENCY MARKET: CARRY-TRADES AND SHORTING THE KRÓNA  
 
Global macroeconomic hedge funds transacted in the Icelandic currency 
market in the period surrounding the crisis through two primary ways: carry-trades 
and shorting the króna. Both activities have received considerable negative 
criticism for introducing heightened volatility into the financial system, stimulating 
contagion, and thus contributing to the twin-crisis. Ironically, the two activities are 
contradictory as carry-trades imply longing the króna, which should immediately 
warrant skepticism of the validity of the critique. Nevertheless, I will illustrate why 
both the carry-trade and shorting the króna are phenomenon that can be explained 
by deeper endogenous structural factors rather than the exogenous agency of hedge 
funds. 
 
3.1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CARRY-TRADE 
 
A carry-trade involves cross-border investments in high-interest rate 
countries funded by capital from a low-interest rate country (Aliber & Zoega 2011). 
In Iceland, there were two methods of capturing the interest-rate differential: 
through buying medium-term ‘glacier bonds’ issued by the banks starting in 2005 
or through derivatives (forwards and options) (ibid). Any financial actor, even retail 
investors, could feasibly perform the ‘glacier’ trade. This is where the ‘Belgian 
dentists’ and ‘Japanese housewives’ trope8 developed (Bergmann 2014), as 
                                               
8 The global popularity of glacier bonds created the trope that even ordinary professionals across 
the world were buying Icelandic debt. 
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international retail investors ploughed an estimated 2.9bn EUR into glacier-bonds 
(Aliber & Zoega 2011). 
Global macroeconomic hedge funds employed the same fundamental 
principle but differed in that they typically utilized derivatives to leverage these 
transactions to stake larger positions. This occurred through borrowing from their 
domestic low-interest rate bank and subsequently partnering with an Icelandic bank 
to swap out the currency exposure. This transaction was high-risk for both 
counterparties. Hedge funds only attempted this trade if the Sharpe ratio9 exceeded 
their fund’s cost of capital, while Icelandic banks indiscriminately accepted carry-
trades to benefit from receiving massive króna deposits to fund domestic 
investment (IMF 2007). Icelandic bank exposure to these types of foreign-
denominated derivatives grew to a material 69% of GDP pre-crisis (Aliber & Zoega 
2011). 
Initially, the trade exhibited a steady yield as the króna gradually 
appreciated 35% against the Euro from 2000 to 2005 (Aliber & Zoega 2011). 
However, the dynamic rapidly unwound with the introduction of speculative 
currency-volatility. Traders moved in early-2006 to close leveraged positions amid 
a reduction in risk appetite and global liquidity fears, forcing a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of accelerated króna depreciation. This event-path has been referred to in 
academia as ‘going up the stairs, coming down the elevator’ (Plantin & Shin 2006; 
Ferguson et al. 2007). It may appear then, that these hedge funds via leveraged 
carry-trades exerted an independent negative destabilizing force on the Icelandic 
macroeconomy. This is a tempting, yet simplistic conclusion. The reality is that 
several structural factors pre-dated these carry-trades, the most significant being (1) 
globally depressed interest rates, (2) Iceland’s divergent monetary and fiscal policy, 
and (3) Icelandic bank demand for mortgage funding in the midst of a housing 
bubble. The carry-trade is the natural manifestation of these structures.  
 
3.1.2 STRUCTURAL CONTOURS THAT SHAPED THE CARRY-TRADE AND SHORTING THE 
KRÓNA  
 
The carry-trade requires a dual-dynamic of low global interest rates with 
pockets of high-yielding investment opportunities. Correspondingly, there are two 
spheres of structural factors: those in an investor’s domestic country and those in 
the foreign country. The effect of pre-2008 globally low interest-rates on the 
creation of international asset-bubbles is extraordinarily well-researched and 
agreed upon as a driving structural feature in the accumulation of carry-trades and 
asset bubbles through investor ‘reach for yield’ (Bean et al. 2015). There is strong 
                                               
9 Interest-rate differential divided by expected volatility of the exchange rate. Higher Sharpe ratios 
indicate more lucrative carry-trade opportunities. 
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evidence for this in that the króna and other carry-trade targets (e.g. the New 
Zealand dollar) experienced significant degrees of co-movement pre-crisis (Portes 
& Baldursson 2007). However, this does not single-handedly explain why Iceland 
in particular was so exceptional as a carry-trade destination versus alternative 
countries. 
The primary idiosyncratic structural feature that stands out in Iceland’s case 
is the stark contrast between monetary and fiscal policy. As described in Section 
2.2.3, Iceland’s government was undertaking procyclical fiscal policies to fulfill 
election promises, while the CBI was simultaneously raising rates. An imbedded 
driver of this dynamic was the CBI’s tacit commitment to a strong króna. Despite 
the CBI not having a formal exchange rate policy goal, it has been quoted multiple 
times as remaining faithful to propping up the exchange rate to stave off inflation 
(CBI 2007). In early 2006, when the króna first faced challenges, the CBI 
immediately raised rates forcefully and asserted its pledge to a higher exchange rate 
consistent with inflation goals (ibid). Effectively, by communicating that the 
exchange rate was one-to-one with inflation targets, the CBI constructed the 
architecture for a (perceived) sustainably high Sharpe-ratio carry-trade by reducing 
the market’s forecasted volatility of the króna. There is evidence of this in the lack 
of the central bank’s exchange-rate fixation in other carry-trade destinations. New 
Zealand’s central bank, for example, explicitly abandoned direct focus on the 
exchange rate in the early 2000s to counteract these types of currency market 
distortions (McDermott & Williams 2018); accordingly, criticism of carry-trading 
macro hedge funds in New Zealand is unheard of because they were not as deployed 
as they were in Iceland.  
In addition to globally depressed interest-rates and divergent monetary and 
fiscal policy, Icelandic bank demand for domestic mortgage financing was crucial 
in facilitating elevated carry-trade volumes, leading some scholars to argue that this 
demand-side factor exerted a greater influence than the supply-side of hedge funds 
hunting for yield (Portes & Baldursson 2007). There was a clear government-
conceived structure that fueled the ballooning domestic demand for mortgage 
financing: the 2003 increase in the Public Housing Fund’s max loan size to 90% of 
a home’s market value (Bergmann 2014). The raising of the max loan clause pitted 
domestic banks against the state housing fund, which had an incentive to live up to 
housing-based election promises under the newly elected Progressive Party. To 
properly compete, the banks both lowered their mortgage rates and welcomed 
foreign capital from the carry-trade with open arms to meet volumes. This further 
augmented the tension between the CBI’s rate-raising and the activities of 
government and private mortgage financiers. The bank’s exposure to currency 
forwards and options from hedge funds in the carry-trade would have never 
approached 69% of GDP levels if appetite for mortgage financing had been reigned 
in to conscionable levels.  
10
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In most respects, the structural rationale for shorting the króna is the same 
for that of the carry-trade. However, hedge funds that went short concluded that the 
opposite effect would occur. They saw the structures of Iceland’s global interest-
rate differential, monetary and fiscal policy divergence, and surging mortgage 
financing demand as an unsustainable framework due for inevitable correction. 
Therefore, hedge funds short the króna coexisted with investors participating in the 
carry-trade and were also a derivative of structural elements. However, the 
influence of 50 or so global macroeconomic hedge funds shorting the króna in 2006 
(Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017) is not an exogenous causal factor in the króna’s 
2006 and 2008 violent course-reversals— the unsustainable structures themselves 
are. There is the counter-argument that short interest in the króna contributed to the 
accelerated rate of currency depreciation and that structural reforms could have 
been gradually implemented with lower economic costs (Stromqvist 2009). 
However, this argument fails to consider that a correction was structurally 
unavoidable, and that delaying a reversal would have time-value costs of its own. 
Furthermore, by acknowledging that ‘structural reforms’ are the root solution to the 
currency imbalance, the critique implicitly concedes that hedge funds are not at the 
core of the problem.  
 
3.2 THE DISTRESSED DEBT MARKET: PURCHASING BANK CLAIMS 
 
While the carry-trade and currency shorting were ammunition for negative 
critics of hedge funds in Iceland, it was by no means idiosyncratic. As discussed, 
there is evidence of repetition in the enabling structures of the carry-trade in other 
countries (e.g. Australia and New Zealand). Where Iceland becomes truly 
exceptional as a hedge fund epicenter is in its unparalleled bank failures and 
ensuing capital controls, a saga ripe with financial, legal, and political complexity. 
It is evident that any opportunity for distressed debt hedge funds in Icelandic bank 
debt was contingent on innumerable structural dynamics. The three most crucial 
were (1) the initial capitalization and debt ownership of the banks that defined the 
extent to which hedge funds could participate, (2) the contemporary neo-liberal 
legal frameworks that allowed for flexible liability restructuring, and (3) the ‘Sir 
Philips’ effect10 (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2017) of severe asset mispricing driven 
by systemic uncertainty and diverse asset complexion. While this paper argues that 
hedge funds are neutral actors coat-tailing pre-determined structures, the positive 
liquidity effect of their involvement here is worth considering to underscore the 
importance of curating advantageous structures.  
 
                                               
10Named after Top Shop founder Sir Philip Green, who offered to buy Baugur’s debt for 5 cents on 
the dollar in 2008. Baugur was the largest Icelandic holding company, a major Glitnir shareholder, 
and had Landsbanki as its largest creditor (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017). 
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3.2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRESSED BANK DEBT TRADE 
 
When Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing collapsed in early 2008, existing 
creditors primarily composed of European banks (Germany owned 50% of the debt) 
(Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017) immediately went to the markets to exit their debt 
ownership in the November CDS auction. It was at this auction that hedge funds 
first bought into Icelandic bank debt — at 6.625% of face value for Kaupthing, 
3.00% for Glitnir, and a mere 1.25% for Landsbanki due to the Icesave issue (see 
Section 2.2.4) (ibid). Meanwhile, the government recognized that it was vital for 
banking services to remain uninterrupted. Unilateral emergency legislation was 
passed to form ‘new banks’ that retained their banking licenses based on extremely 
conservative asset valuations of the ‘old banks’. Rather than recapitalize the new 
entities with debt, the estates of the failed ‘old banks’ were given equity and 
performance bonds to share in any upside resulting from asset monetization and 
revaluation. The performance bonds leveraged the returns that the estates would 
receive if the equity of the new banks appreciated— further increasing the 
attractiveness of claims on the estates to vulture investors. 
For the failed ‘old banks’’ estates, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
of Iceland appointed autonomous winding-up boards to maximize residual asset 
value to creditors. Creditors subsequently filed over 50,000 claims amounting to 
112bn EUR, of which half were accepted by the boards (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 
2017); the claims process was the second major entry-point for hedge funds. At 
first, valuations conducted of the estates found that even the priority deposits (e.g. 
Icesave, Icelandic depositors) were impaired11, leaving zero value for creditors. Yet, 
as the UK’s economic situation began to improve in the second half of 2009, 
valuations quickly rose due to the estates’ ownership of several valuable 
international retail assets. Once it became clear that foreign hedge funds owned the 
increasingly valuable leveraged equity of the new banks through the estates, capital 
controls were installed to prevent currency flight from the claimants. It took major 
concessions years later in 2015 — around 6bn EUR worth — of domestic króna-
based assets for the hedge funds to negotiate a capital controls lift to monetize their 
stakes in the 8.8bn EUR of remaining foreign assets (ibid). 
 
3.2.2 PRE-EXISTING ICELANDIC BANK CAPITALIZATION AND DEBT OWNERSHIP 
 
The pre-existing capitalization and debt ownership of the three Icelandic 
banks is the principal antecedent structural feature that permitted the distressed 
bank debt trade to function. All three Icelandic banks were financed largely by 
                                               
11 Securities are impaired when the total value in a liquidation is not enough to cover their face 
value, causing a recovery less than 100% including any equity conversion. 
12
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/12
private debt issuances and wholesale funding. Of the claims lodged against the 
estates, only 3.3% and 0.5% were priority deposits for Glitnir and Kaupthing, 
respectively (Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson 2017). Landsbanki’s claims were 43% 
composed of priority claims due to the Icesave product (ibid). Post-crash, the 
fulcrum security12 in the capital structure for all three banks walked the line between 
priority deposits and these debt issuances. Because the fulcrum was not clearly deep 
into priority deposits or subordinated debt, there was ample speculative opportunity 
as any residual value past the priority deposits would accrue to the debt securities. 
The speculative option-value of the claims was bolstered by the inclusion of the 
performance bonds mentioned in Section 3.2.1. During an interview on November 
23rd, 2018, a confidential distressed debt hedge fund source who had invested in 
Iceland spoke to the relative unattractiveness of Landsbanki debt due to its 
increased proportion of deposit funding, reinforcing the claim that capital structure 
composition was a key structural factor in hedge fund involvement:  
 
“Landsbanki downside was much higher because depositors were the 
biggest piece of the liability structure. We had a tiny position in Landsbanki, 
but we always felt that the risk-reward was much better for Kaupthing and 
Glitnir because there was little chance you could be a zero on the page.” 
– (Hedge Fund Partner A, personal communication, 23 November 2018) 
 
Initially, the resolution committee’s valuation of Landsbanki only covered 
90% of the priority deposits (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017), resulting in the 1.25% 
debt settlement price at the 2008 CDS auction. The low-price represented potential 
option-value if the valuation increased but mainly reflected the potential to ‘be a 
zero on the page’ as a residual debt claimant. Debt prices were moreover suppressed 
from their pre-crisis ownership in the hands of low-risk European banks with 
liquidity needs of their own. This added a ‘fire sale’ component to the debt transfer 
from bank investors with low illiquidity tolerance to flexible capital distressed 
hedge funds where illiquidity is a primary risk factor driving returns (Smaal 2017). 
Therefore, existence of neoliberal financial structures, such as CDS auctions, have 
beneficial liquidity effects for both parties. As will be seen in Cyprus, the absence 
of these structural elements in the initial capitalization of the banking sector limited 
the ability of distressed debt hedge funds to be involved and depressed returns for 
those that did. 
 
 
                                               
12 The fulcrum security is the tranche of debt in the capital structure that is the first to not receive a 
100% recovery; also referred to as where the ‘value breaks’. 
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3.2.3 ICELANDIC NEO-LIBERAL LEGAL STRUCTURES GOVERNING BANKRUPTCY AND 
DEBT RESTRUCTURING   
 
The neoliberal legal regime surrounding debt restructurings in Iceland was 
another important structural feature that gave foreign hedge funds increased 
comfort in deploying generous capital in the estates of the failed banks. Icelandic 
insolvency law is modeled after English bankruptcy law, colloquially called the 
‘London approach’. The regime, similar to other leading insolvency jurisdictions, 
allows for the neoliberal concept of liability restructuring as opposed to strict 
liquidation or punitive debtor measures. In addition, the London approach has 
historically been considered creditor-friendly in comparison to U.S. Chapter 11’s 
debtor-in-possession structure (the main competing jurisdiction for insolvency 
business), especially in regard to secured creditors. Investment risk for hedge funds 
in Iceland was therefore lowered given there was a proven, renown, and creditor-
centric insolvency framework already in place.  
The specifics of Icelandic law itself provided appealing flexibility on the 
resolution of the estate claims. The three methods to conclude a winding-up process 
in Iceland are: (1) returning the assets of the estate to the shareholders (only valid 
if creditors are paid in full), (2) reaching a CBI-approved composition agreement 
with creditors to write-down their debt claims and take equity in the estate, and (3) 
liquidation of assets, distributing proceeds to creditors (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 
2017). Option (2) is functionally similar to reaching a confirmed reorganization 
plan within U.S. Chapter 11— creditors must consent proportionately to their 
recoveries (e.g. in Kaupthing, if debt recoveries were 30%, then 70% must consent) 
and reach a minimum of 60% of creditors by both value and number of claims. 
Composition can also incorporate aspects of liquidation if there are opportunities 
to sell specific assets at attractive valuations; this would be accretive to the 
recapitalized equity value of the estates. Complete liquidation (3) might have also 
been a feasible option in Iceland given the unique nature of banks’ assets that had 
potential to fetch relatively high sale prices given market conditions (see Section 
3.2.4). However, complete asset liquidation is less flexible than composition and 
therefore less likely to maximize creditor value, especially when assets are illiquid 
and do not have immediate markets for valuation purposes. Indeed, the interviewed 
hedge fund source stated that part of the rationale for assigning a ‘risk premium’ to 
the bank debt trade was the possibility of a sloppy asset liquidation where asset 
value failed to be maximized (Hedge Fund Partner A, personal communication, 23 
November 2018).  
Due to the capital controls battle with the Icelandic government, the 
composition tool became the preeminent legal method to secure concessions for 
each party in light of the uncertainty of liquidation payouts. The agreement allowed 
for inclusion of a stability levy to lift capital controls, and simultaneously allowed 
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hedge funds to monetize 8.8bn EUR of non-ISK assets. This prevented material 
damage to the country’s balance of payments while remaining a favorable deal for 
hedge funds. It is unlikely that hedge funds would have become so deeply invested 
in the bank debt if this legal framework to conclude an insolvency process failed to 
exist in Iceland. The legal structures in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), for 
example, have been found to suffer from the lack of business norms surrounding 
corporate restructuring, and would likely garner capital investment benefits from 
implementing similar structures (Bufford 1996). This is a critical reason for why 
hedge funds choose to be involved in CEE countries less frequently.  
 
3.2.4 THE ‘SIR PHILIPS’ EFFECT OF SEVERE ASSET MISPRICING AND DIVERSE 
INTERNATIONAL ASSET COMPLEXION  
 
The final structural component that differentiated the Icelandic banking 
situation for hedge funds was the unique asset complexion on the banks’ balance 
sheets. Aside from accumulating substantial foreign deposits in the lead up to the 
crisis as discussed in Section 3.1, the banks were lauded for their debt-financed 
corporate buyout wizardry, especially Kaupthing. The bank first achieved 
international fame from the panache of its debt-financed net 950bn EUR acquisition 
of FIH in 2004, the third largest Danish bank (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017). This 
acquisition doubled its balance sheet and amounted for 4% of Iceland’s GDP, yet 
nonetheless, credit agencies upgraded Kaupthing credit post-closing (ibid). The 
FIH acquisition was just the beginning— Kaupthing went on to purchase Norway-
based Sundvall in 2004, a 20% stake in the Indian Finoble Advisors, UK firm 
Singer & Friedlander in 2005, and Belgian bank Robeco in 2007 (ibid). In 2007, on 
the eve of the crisis, Kaupthing launched Kaupthing Edge through Singer & 
Friedlander, an internet-based European deposit-product, which grew to 2.5bn GBP 
of foreign deposits (Anderson 2008). While foreign European banks were opposed 
to investing in the equity of risky corporate chess play, they were extremely willing 
to lend debt in the deals collateralized by equity in the target. Subsequently, 
Kaupthing would list a portion of the equity of the acquired subsidiary on the ICEX, 
in turn receiving additional cash for the next acquisition. The end-result was that 
90% of Kaupthing’s assets by book value were outside Iceland and European banks 
held the majority of its debt (ibid).  
Baugur Group, the largest Icelandic holding company and one of the largest 
shareholders in Glitnir, also embarked on an unprecedented international 
investment spree. Baugur had majority and minority stakes in Iceland (the frozen 
food retailer), jeweler group Aurum Holdings (owns Goldsmiths, Mappin & Webb, 
and Mosaic Fashions), House of Fraser, Hamleys, West Ham United, Somerfield, 
Iceland Foods, the fashion chains All Saints, Oasis and Karen Millen, and pubs 
Slug & Lettuce and Yates (Bowers 2011; Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017). 
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Indirectly, Baugur was responsible for 53,000 UK jobs (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 
2017). The largest creditor in Baugur’s capital structure turned out to be Landsbanki 
(ibid), and when Baugur’s leveraged capital structure came under pressure, 
Landsbanki maneuvered to take administrative control of its assets. Thus, the 
valuation of Baugur’s assets became a key determinant of Landsbanki debt prices. 
The significance of the international asset portfolios of the failed bank 
estates was twofold. First is a mispricing effect, in that they were intrinsically 
valuable assets under temporary economic pressures from the global financial 
crisis; the second was that the bulk of foreign-assets over domestic Icelandic assets 
mitigated the already substantial risk exposure from króna weakness (absent the 
capital controls issue). In regard to the first idea, Jónsson and Sigurgeirsson call 
this temporary pricing pressure the ‘Sir Philips effect’, after the Top Shop founder 
Sir Philip Green, who offered to buy Baugur’s debt for 5 cents on the dollar in 2008. 
The audacity of Sir Philip’s offer lies in its flagrant undervaluation of the estate’s 
assets; most practitioners would arrive at a far higher valuation than his offer by 
performing a sum-of-the-parts going-concern valuation of the web of investments 
contained in each of the three Icelandic banks’ balance sheets. For example, in the 
initial panic, Glitnir’s Norwegian subsidiary was sold for 35mm EUR, or 10% of 
its book equity value. Only one month later, it was worth 236mm EUR on the 
balance sheet of its acquirer (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017). Even the Chairman 
of the Progressive Party at the time (and later the PM under the capital controls 
saga), Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, called for the government to buy the debt 
of the estates at 1 – 5 cents on the dollar while they were mispriced (Moore 2018).  
In the hedge fund industry, this form of mispricing is referred to as a wealth 
transfer from impatient to patient hands. Through patient asset monetization in a 
recovering global economy, hedge funds could slowly convert these illiquid stakes 
in valuable European brands into liquid foreign-currency denominated assets. The 
added benefit was that, once liquidated, the assets could be reliably valued in stable 
foreign currency; this ended up amounting to 8.8bn of foreign assets, 6bn of which 
was liquid as early as 2012 (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017). Without this defining 
structure, the risks in the bank debt would have been incrementally greater and 
hedge funds would have invested less than the billions of dollars they did put on 
the line. This is evidenced in other Eurozone crisis economies, such as Spain and 
Ireland, where bank assets were confined to the domestic domain, e.g. domestic 
mortgage loans (Buck 2017; O’Sullivan & Kennedy 2010). In those countries, a 
recovery in the asset values was far more correlated to a recovery in the domestic 
economy and the housing market, in comparison to Iceland, where bank recoveries 
hinged on the UK retail sector and specific corporate investments. Therefore, while 
hedge funds provided substantial liquidity through bank claims in Iceland, this was 
provisional on the unique quality and geographic diversification of the underlying 
assets. 
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4 ANALYSIS OF HEDGE FUNDS IN CYPRUS 
 
4.1 DISTRESSED CYPRIOT BANKS: PROVIDING LIQUIDITY TO FROZEN 
DEPOSITORS AND RECAPITALIZING BANK OF CYPRUS  
 
In many ways, hedge funds yearned to get involved in the Cypriot financial 
crisis to the extent that they did in Iceland. First, they investigated the possibility 
of freeing frozen deposits in both of the failed banks, Laiki and BoC, a potentially 
lucrative trade given the liquidity needs of depositors and the protracted resolution 
timeline. However, due to the structural elements of (1) European animosity 
towards perceived Russian malefaction, (2) high-fixed legal costs of buying out 
miniscule retail deposits, and (3) legal uncertainties on transferring deposit 
interests, this trade did not approach material levels. Still flirting with the possibility 
of a brighter future for the banking sector, some hedge funds bought equity in the 
rolled up Laiki and BoC combination (‘new BoC’). Due to lackluster foreclosure 
laws, non-performing loans (NPLs) continued to rise on the balance sheet of new 
BoC, causing the bank’s equity to fall substantially. It appears that the sole winning 
hedge fund trade in Cyprus was buying sovereign debt. Again, the structure of 
English bankruptcy law lent a helping hand to foreign creditors, as did the Cypriot 
banking sector’s ownership of the sovereign debt. This legal system prevented 
Cyprus from forcing a Greek-style debt write-down. The disparate activity levels 
of hedge funds among these three trades— buying out frozen deposits, purchasing 
recapitalization equity, and going long sovereign debt— confirms the presence of 
key structures as a driving force in how, when, and why hedge funds transact during 
crises. 
 
4.1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE DISTRESSED DEPOSIT TRADE 
 
Post Greek-PSI, Cyprus agreed to several conditions to receive its 10bn 
EUR recovery package from the troika, collectively referred to as ‘the bail-in’ (see 
Section 2.3.2). This included capital controls, austerity measures (e.g. property and 
corporate tax increases), and a significant restructuring of Laiki, BoC, and smaller 
regional banks. While a 9.9% and 6.75% tax levy in the form of a 37.5% deposit 
conversion into recapitalized equity was eventually applied to BoC deposits over 
and under 100,000 EUR (Theodore & Theodore 2015), respectively, this was the 
result of a years-long negotiation process and Cypriot parliamentary approval. 
Additionally, uninsured Laiki depositors were left out of the deal, frozen in the ‘bad 
bank’ whose primary asset was the 18% equity share in BoC; these are believed to 
have been effectively written-down to zero. This time of uncertainty presented a 
tactical opportunity for hedge funds, with flexible capital bases and institutional 
expertise, to buy out deposits in Laiki and BoC at steep discounts. If the deposit 
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was purchased at a discount to the ultimate levy, the hedge fund would profit. For 
example, a BoC deposit over 100,000 EUR purchased for 20 cents on the dollar 
would net a 182% gross return13, not accounting for time value of money and 
excluding the fresh equity in BoC. An insured deposit bought out in Laiki, however, 
would be worthless. 
 
4.1.2 STRUCTURAL CONTOURS THAT SHAPED THE DISTRESSED DEPOSIT TRADE 
 
The first critical structural element that provided for the distressed deposit 
trade was the converse of what existed in Iceland. The existing capitalization of 
Laiki and BoC had virtually nonexistent senior debt. In Laiki, deposits accounted 
for 17.9bn EUR or 59% of the bank’s liabilities, with the second largest security in 
the liability stack being ELA funding at 10.2bn EUR or 34% of liabilities (Cotterill 
2013). Laiki’s minimal ~100mm EUR in senior debt was illiquid due to 
concentrated private ownership (Hedge Fund Partner A, personal communication, 
23 November 2018). Thus, it was in practice cost prohibitive to buy into the senior 
debt. Furthermore, this capital structure led hedge funds to believe that the fulcrum 
clearly existed somewhere in the deposit and ELA liabilities; ELA funding was 
likely to roll over given the troika’s continued bail-in contingent support. This 
dynamic elevated deposits to the forefront of hedge fund interest.  
On the supply side, serious uncertainty was required to convince depositors 
to part ways with their stakes for severe discounts. The political wrestling with the 
troika provided plenty of unpredictability. At times, the media even reported that 
the levy could approach 30% or 40% of deposits (RT 2013), and indeed, Laiki 
depositors above 100,000 EUR lost their entire stake in the final form of the bail-
in. This uncertainty and the divergent outcomes of depositors in Laiki and BoC 
were key factors for hedge funds in analyzing the deposit trade and this was 
corroborated by the interviewed hedge fund source (Hedge Fund Partner B, 
personal communication, 23 November 2018). Thus, a pattern emerges where 
hedge funds invest when uncertainty is highest, and securities are at their most 
ambiguous points as this opens up the doors to possible excess returns. 
At the same time, however, several structural features prevented this trade 
from achieving higher volumes and becoming a full-fledged liquidity boon for 
deposit holders. The most significant appears to be the potential culpability 
resulting from buying tainted Russian deposits. It is unclear to what extent deposits 
were actually corrupted by money-laundering and other schemes. Yet, the high-
profile incident of a Russian lawyer’s14 exposure of $230mm USD in Russian 
officials’ tax fraud— $30mm of which was funneled through Cyprus 
                                               
13 [((100 – 9.9 [levy]) * (1 – .375 [equity conversion])) / 20] – 1 = 182% cash return 
14 Sergei Magnitsky was the general council at a Russia-based hedge fund, Hermitage Capital. 
When he exposed the tax fraud scheme, he was jailed and died in Russian prison. 
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— exacerbated existing concerns and fueled speculation as to the extent of ‘dirty 
money’ in the deposits (Belton 2013). European and German emphasis on this 
issue, particularly as Merkel was up for re-election in September 2013, became a 
material deterrent for hedge funds looking to buy out larger enterprise deposits. As 
mentioned in Section 2.1, hedge funds typically evade the limelight. Thus, this risk 
factor was vital deterrent for some funds including the one interviewed:  
 
“Cyprus had been used for years as an entity to funnel money into Europe. 
Whether or not that actually was ‘dirty’ money is another question. 
However, there is certainly high suspicion that some proportion of it is not 
clean. That backdrop was important for us as we looked at the Cyprus 
situation.” (Hedge Fund Partner A, personal communication, 23 November 
2018). 
 
Excluding these potentially tainted large enterprise deposits left only small 
retail deposits primarily composed of Cypriot citizens’ savings. Larger wealthy 
retail depositors approached by hedge funds were reluctant to pay the steep 
discounts, driven by the illiquidity premium, demanded by the hedge funds (Forelle 
2013). Additionally, there were several legal complications involved. For one, the 
ability to transfer legal ownership in a deposit within Cypriot law was a dubious 
necessity for the trade to function (Winkworth et al. 2013). It appears a few players 
were able to work around this by creating investment holding companies to 
purchase diversified equity in Cypriot-domiciled businesses whose sole assets were 
deposits (ibid); this, however, still runs into the ‘tainted money’ issue. Others 
attempted to draft participation structures that allowed sharing in the economics of 
a freed deposit without ceding legal ownership of the deposit (ibid). These contracts 
were inherently one-off solutions and entailed sizeable upfront fixed legal costs. 
Therefore, it is evident that there is a heightened tension between potentially 
massive returns garnered by providing liquidity to the banking system, and several 
political, legal, and economic structures that introduced additional risk premia into 
the trade dynamic. This tension prevented the frozen deposit trade from ever 
gaining material trade volume.  
 
4.1.3 STRUCTURAL CONTOURS THAT SHAPED THE BANK OF CYPRUS RECAPITALIZATION 
EQUITY INVESTMENT 
 
Hedge funds continued to speculate on the fate of the Cypriot banking sector 
after the rollup of Laiki and BoC. The primary structures that induced hedge funds 
to get involved in the reorganized (reorg) bank’s equity was (1) the bank’s 
strengthened market position from elimination of the competitive banking duopoly 
and (2) its fortification with recapitalization funds from both the conversion of 
19
Mah: Hedge Funds in the Periphery
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
deposits to equity and 10bn EUR in troika funds. Furthermore, many funds saw the 
equity as heavily discounted due to the structural ownership imposed by the bail-
in. Cypriot citizens and Russian enterprises who had parked cash in the banking 
system suddenly were holding 64% of new BoC’s risky reorg equity (Demetriou 
2017) and quickly moved to dump their shares on the secondary market. This was 
erroneously perceived as a fire sale by some hedge funds that used the opportunity 
to purchase fresh equity. Lamesa Holdings, Tyrus Capital, and American investor 
Wilbur Ross together deployed over 500mm EUR in new BoC equity, making most 
of their positions in late 2013 to 2015 (ibid).  
However, as in the deposit trade, there were structural elements that caused 
apprehension among hedge funds considering buying reorganized equity in new 
BoC. The most significant appears to be Cyprus’s mixed legal system of common-
law and civil-law, which contained weak foreclosure and insolvency laws. The IMF 
and ESM had long been concerned with this system (IMF 2014; Cyprus Mail 2018), 
citing that weak enforcement laws have caused home foreclosures to take years. 
Furthermore, the procedure for transferring title deeds was cumbersome, and in the 
flurry of the 2013 crisis, this ‘trapped’ many home buyers into property they no 
longer held legal title to (ibid). The courts were ill-equipped to handle the uptick in 
these cases, incentivizing widespread strategic defaulting on mortgages before 
Cypriot law could be modernized. The interviewed hedge fund had undertaken a 
deep analysis on these issues. Their view was that, due to these legal and 
bureaucratic structural frictions, strategic defaults would drive non-performing loan 
exposure at new BoC to continue to climb post-reorg absent any government reform 
(Hedge Fund Partner B, personal communication, 23 November 2018). This view 
later proved to be correct, and BoC’s share price since the second half of 2013 has 
fallen substantially. NPLs from 2013 to 2014 grew from an already massive ~53% 
of the balance-sheet to above 60% (Simões 2017)15. Thus, while hedge funds were 
involved in this reorg equity, the involvement was limited due to the risk introduced 
by outdated legal structures. It appears that, had Cyprus’s convoluted legal system 
for foreclosures and insolvency been updated pre-crisis to more aggressive modern 
English standards, more hedge funds would have invested in new BoC’s equity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
15 It is worth noting that the NPL proportion at BoC has since come down to ~40% despite their 
initial rise in 2013 – 2015. This is partially attributable to the passage of new foreclosure laws in 
2018. However, this has occurred too late to benefit the equity prices, which fell a further 50% in 
the last year alone even after a 25% rally in shares after passage of the new law (Yahoo Finance 
2018) 
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4.2 THE SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKET: BUYING CYPRIOT DEBT PRE-BAIL-IN 
 
4.2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE CYPRIOT SOVEREIGN DEBT TRADE 
 
The primary widespread successful hedge fund trade in Cyprus was hedge 
funds’ purchase of distressed sovereign debt. Pre-bail-in, the 2020 bonds were 
trading around 75 cents on the dollar. This price reflected the market’s subjective 
probability estimation that the troika would enforce a Greek-style PSI debt write-
down in Cyprus, causing the sovereign debt to take a material hit. However, due to 
several idiosyncratic structural factors at play in Cyprus, some hedge funds had 
reason to believe that a PSI would not occur. In the words of Buchheit et al., due to 
these structures, it seemed that European officials would yet again “steel their hearts 
against the pleas of the old age pensioners, the unemployed, the homeless, the sick, 
the blind and the lame in bailout recipient countries” to protect some “hedge fund 
manager in Greenwich, Connecticut who [held] the country’s debt obligations” 
(Buchheit et al. 2013).  
Firstly, the baseline bailout scenario was a relief package where, by 
necessity, some group would be forced to take a write-down. As in the deposit trade, 
this was due to the appearance of questionable Russian financial activity in Cyprus 
and mounting political pressure in Germany during an election year. Accordingly, 
the 17bn EUR in funds Cyprus needed for its banking sector was never going to be 
fully available from European sources alone. The 7bn EUR in funds beyond the 
10bn EUR that the troika eventually promised had to be covered by one of the 
following groups: (1) domestic sovereign bondholders, (2) foreign sovereign 
bondholders, (3) bank depositors. As discussed, the last, bank depositors, ended up 
providing the windfall for the gap. Hedge funds that correctly determined that 
sovereign bondholders would be made whole ended up earning an approximate 
33% in absolute returns16 in a very short period of time.  
 
4.2.2 STRUCTURES PREVENTING AN EFFECTIVE WRITE-DOWN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN 
SOVEREIGN CREDITORS 
 
It was well-known by the markets that the largest domestic Cypriot 
sovereign bondholders were Laiki and BoC themselves (Cotterill 2013). As Partner 
B at the interviewed hedge fund noted: 
 
“The interlinkages between the banks and the sovereign was incredibly close. 
The banks were the biggest owners of sovereign debt, and so you create this 
                                               
16 100 / 75 – 1 = 33% 
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circle that becomes very quickly quite vicious.” (Hedge Fund Partner B, 
personal communication, 23 November 2018) 
 
This ownership structure caused a domestic sovereign bondholder write-
down to be a zero-sum contribution for the Cypriot economy. Thus, Cyprus turned 
to the possibility of writing down foreign bondholders in the same manner as the 
Greek-PSI. In 2012, Greek bonds traded to a low of 12 to 13 cents, with many 
believing that Greece was likely to leave the Eurozone (Thomas 2012). Hedge 
funds scooped up this debt, which was paid out at 33 cents on the dollar after 97% 
of creditors approved the restructuring plan (Buchheit et al. 2013). A key lever for 
the Greek government was the legal structures governing the bonds. The local law 
had collective action clauses, allowing Greece to threaten to force bondholders to 
accept lower recoveries. Cyprus, however, crucially lacked these collective action 
clauses in the law governing its sovereign debt. The creditor-friendly English 
bankruptcy law in adopted in Cyprus, in part to reinforce its status as a global 
banking regime, prevents the government from imposing any losses on foreign 
creditors. Additionally, hedge funds are more likely to be holdout creditors than 
other types of foreign investors (such as sovereign wealth funds, foreign banks, or 
retail investors) due to their loose mandates and malleable legal structure discussed 
in Section 2.1 (Buchheit et al. 2013). In Greece, a fund called Dart Management 
was a holdout in the PSI and later received a full recovery (Thomas 2012). Cypriot 
gas reserves (see next section 4.2.3) provided ample reason to believe that these 
types of holdouts would be more prevalent than even in Greece due to the 
speculative option-value of these reserves. Thus, the inability of Cyprus to threaten 
use of a collective action clause both decreased the effectiveness of a PSI in terms 
of potential quantum of debt write-down and raised the probability of holdout 
creditors.  
 
4.2.3 POTENTIALLY VALUABLE NATURAL GAS RESERVES EMBOLDENED HEDGE FUND 
CREDITORS 
 
Aside from the legal structures governing foreign creditors in Cyprus, hedge 
funds had yet another reason to be optimistic in holding sovereign debt: the 
Aphrodite gas fields off the Cypriot coast. Valuable natural resources, even those 
that are yet to be in the development stage of their lifecycle, can be a godsend for 
creditors. This value is evidenced in less-developed countries (LDCs) recent 
utilization of natural resource reserves as collateral for loans to achieve cheaper 
funding (Halland & Canuto 2013). For Cyprus, the net revenues that could be 
produced by the Aphrodite natural gas reserves were estimated to be able to cover 
a third of Cypriot sovereign debt (Joy 2013). Thus, many hedge funds believed they 
could seize control of the reserve assets to bolster their debt recoveries (Hedge Fund 
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Partner A, personal communication, 23 November 2018). At the minimum, this 
might encourage them to holdout in any Cypriot PSI.  
Therefore, hedge fund holding of sovereign debt was unmistakably a 
derivative of these structural features: primarily the inability to write-down both 
domestic and foreign bondholders, but also the presence of a crown asset off of the 
country’s coast. Without these structures, hedge funds would have scant reasons 
for investing in the sovereign debt of a country on the verge of bankruptcy.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
Using Iceland and Cyprus as case studies in hedge fund actors during 
financial crises, I have demonstrated that hedge fund involvement is contingent on 
antecedent structural factors rather than exogenous agency. In other words, the 
notion that hedge funds may one day simply decide to unilaterally “make a last stab 
at breaking down [a] financial system,” in Oddsson’s words (Ibison 2008), is false. 
Economic, political, and legal configurations rather than autonomous agency both 
galvanized and limited hedge funds to act.  
Bringing both crises into the fold accentuates the specific structural factors 
in Iceland and Cyprus that precipitated the contrasting involvement of hedge fund 
actors. The divergent structures of the two banking systems were among the most 
eminent; this extended to both the liability and asset side. Capitalization differences 
were vast: as discussed, Cyprus had extensive ELA funding, Iceland did not; 
Cyprus had tens of billions of domestic and foreign deposits, Iceland did not; 
Cyprus lacked senior debt, while for Iceland, senior debt was its largest liability. 
The result was that Cypriot banks’ fulcrum security rested in their deposits, whereas 
in Icelandic banks, it initially walked the line between deposits and senior debt, 
conclusively resting in the latter. Senior debt is a far easier security for hedge funds 
to invest in— it trades in secondary markets, can be purchased during CDS 
auctions, and lacks the legal ownership complications of transferring deposit rights. 
Thus, this structure explains why hedge funds were profoundly invested in 
Icelandic senior debt and failed to gain widespread traction in Cypriot deposits. It 
is also no surprise that Landsbanki, the Icelandic bank with the highest proportion 
of deposits in its liability structure due to Icesave, exhibited the least hedge fund 
interest and also the lowest ultimate recoveries among all three banks at 14 cents 
on the dollar (Jónsson & Sigurgeirsson 2017).  
The asset side of the balance sheet for the two banking systems furthers 
understanding of the disparate involvements and results of hedge funds in the two 
crises. Icelandic bank assets, mainly distinguished UK retail chains as discussed in 
Section 3.2.4, were vastly higher quality than Cyprus bank holdings of Greek and 
Cypriot sovereign debt. Cypriot bank ownership of its own nation’s sovereign debt 
in particular was a structure that was irreproducible in Iceland due to minimal 
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sovereign debt. This circular ownership made it economically insurmountable to 
write-down Cypriot sovereign debt, while enhancing the leverage of the troika in 
negotiations (i.e. ‘if you reject the bail-in, the entire financial system will go 
under’).  
Legal structures were also influential. While both Iceland and Cyprus are 
governed by English bankruptcy law, Cyprus had idiosyncrasies in its foreclosure 
laws that caused bureaucratic frictions in the wake of the crisis as discussed in 
Section 4.1.3. The ensuing NPL increase caused downwards pressure on BoC’s 
recapitalized equity, which has since lost a substantial amount of its value. In 
Iceland, bank claims were the equivalent of recapitalized equity because the claims 
owned the estates which in turn owned the equity of the new Icelandic banks. 
However, bank claim values were less correlated with domestic Icelandic mortgage 
assets due to the presence of valuable foreign assets. Indeed, hedge funds even 
conceded ownership of these 6bn EUR in króna denominated assets to unlock the 
value of the foreign ones. Thus, the legal regime governing Icelandic mortgage 
foreclosures was inconsequential for hedge funds, whereas in Cyprus, it was a key 
driver of returns and extent of hedge fund involvement in bank equity.  
Finally, Cyprus’ inclusion in the European Union and common currency 
were deterrents for certain hedge fund involvements. The Euro effectively 
prevented the massive carry-trade that occurred in Iceland. Without its own central 
bank, Cyprus could not create the contrasting fiscal and monetary policy dynamic 
that propped up high interest-rates and thereby motivated the carry-trade. Inclusion 
within the EU framework also provided for the material ELA funding received by 
the Cypriot banks, which disincentivized them from securing senior debt financing 
as an alternative. European status as the lender-of-last-resort was the driving force 
behind the bail-in as opposed to a traditional bailout. Unlike in Iceland, where the 
composition agreement under Icelandic law allowed creditors a say in approving a 
restructuring plan, the bail-in imposed by the troika in Cyprus gave depositors zero 
approval capabilities. This is a serious impediment for hedge funds to invest, as 
they would effectively be subjecting themselves to the unilateral will of a 
supernational authority. 
Positive and negative lens of perceiving hedge funds have the commonality 
that they eschew antecedent structural features in favor of painting hedge funds in 
a particular light. A structuralist perspective for hedge funds proves far more 
satisfactory in grasping the root motivations of their market activities as 
exemplified by the nuanced Icelandic and Cypriot situations. These structures in 
Iceland and Cyprus were conceived before any hedge funds arrived on the scene. 
The resulting timing differential of pre-established structures and present-day 
hedge fund activities makes individual hedge funds erroneously appear to be the 
more pertinent unit of analysis given their proximity as a crisis unfolds. However, 
hedge funds are fluid vehicles— they adapt to fit the contours of their pre-
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determined environment. Thus, myopically zooming in on the activities of specific 
hedge funds is missing the forest for the trees. Moving forwards, it is important to 
adopt a structuralist viewpoint if the core motivations of these opaque financial 
market actors are to be understood effectively in future crises. Hedge fund crisis 
behavior should be regarded as analogous to pouring water into a basin: it is the 
structure of the container that determines where the water will flow.
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